Wyner's elegant model of wiretap channel exploits noise in the communication channel to provide perfect secrecy against a computationally unlimited passive eavesdropper, without requiring a shared key. We consider an adversarial model of wiretap channel in which the adversary is active: it selects a fraction ρr of the transmitted codeword to eavesdrop, and a fraction ρw to corrupt by "adding" adversarial error. The model is interesting as it also captures networks adversaries in the setting of Secure Message Transmission [7] . It has been proved that secure transmission (in one message-round) is possible if and only if ρr + ρw < 1.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Wyner's [20] model of secure communication and its generalization to broadcast scenario [5] , Alice is connected to Bob and Eve through two noisy channels, referred to as the main channel and the eavesdropper channel, respectively. The goal is to send a message from Alice to Bob with perfect secrecy and reliability. Wyner's pioneering work showed that communication with (asymptotic) perfect secrecy and reliability is possible if the eavesdropper's channel is noisier than the main channel. Importantly, security is information theoretic and does not require a pre-shared secret key. Adversarial modeling of wiretap channel where the adversary is active, dates back to Ozarow and Wyner [13] . In their model, instead of the noise corrupting the adversary's view of the transmitted codeword, the adversary can select a fraction of the codeword to "see". More recently, wiretap channels where the active adversary also corrupts the communication, have been considered [1] , [3] , [11] , [18] . In these models the adversary can select its view (also, observation or eavesdropping) of the communication, and is also able to partially jam the channel by injecting noise in the main channel. In this paper we consider a model of adversarial wiretap channel (AWTP channel) [18] , [19] in which the adversary can adaptively choose, a fraction ρ r of the coordinates of the sent codeword for eavesdropping, and a fraction ρ w of the codeword to corrupt by adding an adversarial noise to the channel. The sets of eavesdropped and corrupted components are denoted by S r and S w , respectively.The adversary's eavesdropping and corruption is adaptive: for each action the adversary uses its observations and corruptions up to that point, to make its next choice. The goal of the adversary is to break the security and/or reliability of the communication. Codes that provide security and reliability for these channels are called AWTP -codes. Interestingly, AWTP model is directly related to Secure Message Transmission (SMT) problem [7] in networks. In this model, Alice and Bob are connected by N node disjoint paths a subset of which is controlled by a computationally unlimited adversary. The goal is to provide secrecy and reliability for message transmission from Alice to Bob. The adversary in AWTP channel is more general (powerful) than the widely studied threshold SMT adversary because it can choose possibly different subsets for eavesdropping and corruption.
Motivation: It was proved [18] that perfect secrecy and reliability for AWTP in 1-round communication is only possible if ρ r +ρ w < 1. We consider a scenario where in addition to the AWTP channel, a public discussion channel denoted by PD, is available to the communicants. We call this model AWTP with public discussion (or AWTP PD for short). Our goal is to see if the use of this extra resource can make secure communication possible when ρ r + ρ w > 1 (for example ρ r = ρ w = 0.9).
Public discussion channels had been considered in both wiretap and SMT models. In wiretap setting it was shown [2] , [10] that a public discussion channel substantially expands the range of scenarios in which secure communication is possible. In particular secure communication becomes possible even if the eavesdropper channel is less noisy than the main channel. Access to a public discussion channel in SMT was considered by Garay et.al. [8] who showed that secure message tranmission is possible when N ≥ t + 1 while without a PD , N ≥ 2t + 1. Here N and t are the total number of wires, and those corrupted by the adversary, respectively. Public discussion channel can be realized by using a message authentication protocol in the manual channel model [12] . The communication complexity of PD will be kept low.
We allow communicants to interact over the PD but assume communication over the AWTP channel is one-way and from Alice to Bob. This restriction is to simplify our analysis. This is a natural model in settings such as a powerful base station sending messages to nodes.
A. Our work 1) Model and Definitions: We define a multi-round message transmission protocol over AWTP PD . The protocol may leak information to the adversary, and the decoder may output an incorrect message. We define secrecy as the statistical distance between the adversary's view of any two adversarially chosen messages, and reliability as the probability that the decoded message be different from the sent one for any message.
An AWTP PD protocol in general has multiple message rounds. In each message-round a protocol message is sent by Alice over the AWTP channel, or the PD channel, or by Bob over the PD channel. Each message can have a different length. In each invocation of the AWTP channel, the adversary can choose a different read and write set. An ( , δ)-AWTP PD protocol guarantees that the leaked information about the message is bounded by , and the probability of decoding an incorrect message is bounded by δ. The information rate R of a AWTP PD protocol measures transmission efficiency of the protocol over the AWTP channel, and is the number of message (information) bits transmitted by the protocol, divided by the total number of transmitted bits over this channel. The secrecy capacity C of an AWTP PD channel is the maximum information rate that can be achieved by a AWTP PD protocol family, as the total number of bits sent over the AWTP channel goes to infinity, assuming the security loss is bounded by .
2) Bounds: We derive a tight upper bound on R. We first derive a bound on H(M ), and then use the bound to prove that the highest secrecy rate of an ( , δ)-AWTP PD protocol is bounded by C ≤ 1 − ρ + 2 · (1 + log |Σ| 1 ) + 2 n, where n is the total (bit) length of the transmission over the PD channel, Σ is the alphabet of the AWTP channel, and ρ = 1 N |S r ∪ S w | is the fraction of components of a codeword that are read or corrupted, by the adversary. For perfect secrecy capacity we have C 0 ≤ 1−ρ. When S r ∩S w = ∅, we have ρ < ρ r +ρ w , and perfectly secure communication is possible even if ρ r + ρ w > 1 (e.g. ρ r = ρ w = 0.9), as long as ρ < 1.
A second efficiency measure is the message-round complexity RC m of the protocol. We derive a tight lower bound on RC m for any AWTP PD protocol (one-way communication over AWTP ) with nonzero rate, when ρ r +ρ w > 1. We show that a secure AWTP PD protocol with ρ r + ρ w > 1 and ρ < 1, cannot have two message rounds and so RC m ≥ 3.
3) Construction: We construct a family of three messageround (0, δ)-AWTP PD protocols for which the rate can be made arbitrarily close to the upper bound. That is, for any small ξ > 0, there is N 0 such that for all N > N 0 , the rate of the AWTP PD protocol family satisfies R ≥ 1 − ρ − ξ, and so the family achieves the capacity. The number of message-rounds of the protocol is minimal and meets the lower bound on RC m . The construction is as follows. In the first messageround Alice sends to Bob over the AWTP channel a random sequence over Σ. In the second message-round, Bob randomly chooses elements of a universal hash family and calculates a hash value for each of the received elements, and sends the hash values and the randomness used for choosing the hash functions, to Alice over the PD channel. In the third messageround, Alice, encrypts the message using a key that is extracted from the random values that are correctly received by Bob, and sends it over the PD channel to Bob, together with sufficient information that allows Bob to calculate the same key and recover the message.
B. Relation with SMT-PD
In secure message transmission with public discussion channel (SMT-PD) [8] , in additions to wires, communicants have access to a PD . Efficiency of SMT-PD protocols is in terms of the transmission rate (number transmitted bits over wires for each message bit).
Previous works on AWTP showed a direct correspondence between a 1-round symmetric SMT protocol and a AWTP code. A symmetric SMT protocol requires the set of transcripts on every wire to be the same. All known threshold SMT protocols are symmetric. In the rest of this paper, we consider symmetric SMT protocols. In Section VI we define ( , δ)-SMT [ow−s] -PD , a subset of SMT-PD protocols in which only Alice can send protocol messages over the wires but PD can be used in both ways. The bounds and the construction of AWTP PD result in a lower bound on the transmission rate, a lower bound on the message-round complexity, and a new construction for ( , δ)-SMT [ow−s] -PD . In Section VI we compare these results with the known bounds and constructions of SMT-PD. In particular the message-round lower bound for ( , δ)-SMT [ow−s] -PD also lower bounds the message-round complexity of the general SMT-PD (two-way communication over wires), and will be compared with the message-round complexity bounds in [8] , [16] . A detailed comparison of the construction with the ones in [8] , [16] is given in Table 1 . Among known constructions of SMT-PD protocols with leakage bounded by and achieving the upper bound on the information rate of an -SMT [ow−s] -PD family (when the number of wires grows while fractions ρ r and ρ w are fixed), the unique property of our construction is that the adversary's eavesdropping and corruption sets can be different.
C. Related Work
Maurer's [10] introduced PD channels in the context of key agreement over wiretap channels; they were also independently considered in [2] . In this model since the PD channel is assumed free, the established key can be used to send the message securely over this channel and so the communication cost of the message transmission will stay the same as that of the key establishment. Our construction also has two steps: a key establishment, followed by encrypting the message and sending it over the public discussion channel. This is also the approach in [8] (Protocol I) and [16] . The model of adversarial wiretap in [14] , [15] extends wiretap II to include active (jamming) adversarial noise.
SMT-PD was introduced in [9] and bounds on the number of rounds were derived in [16] . In [8] a bound on the transmission rate over wires (not including communication over the PD ) was derived. The paper presents two constructions. Protocol I which is optimal in the sense that the transmission rate is of the order of the bound, as the number of wires increases. In protocol II the goal is to minimize communication complexity over the PD , at the expense of lower rate on the wires. Table VI-A2 compares the information rate of these constructions for large N .
D. Organization
In Section 2, we introduce AWTP channel and the PD channel, and in Section 3, define AWTP PD protocols. In Section 4, we derive bounds on rate and message-round complexity, and in Section 5, give the construction of an optimal AWTP PD protocol. Section 6 is on the relation between AWTP PD and SMT-PD protocols. In Section 7, we discuss our results and future works.
II. PRELIMINARIES
We use, calligraphic letters X to denote sets, Pr(X) to denote a probability distribution on the set X , and X to denote a random variable that takes values from X with probability Pr(X). The conditional probability of X given E, is Pr[X = x|E]. log() is logarithm in base two. Shannon entropy of a random variable X is, H(X) = x Pr(x) log Pr(x), and conditional entropy of a variable X given Y , is H(X|Y ) =
x,y Pr(x, y) log Pr(x|y). The min-entropy of a variable X is H ∞ (X) = min x∈X − log Pr(X = x). Statistical distance between two random variables X 1 , X 2 , defined over X , is given by SD(X 1 ,
Mutual information between random variables X and Y is given by, I(X, Y ) = H(X) − H(X|Y ). Hamming weight of a vector e is denoted by be wt(e).
A. Channel Models
We consider two types of channels: AWTP channel and PD channel. A channel can be one-way or two-way.
Definition 1: A one-way channel from Alice to Bob (Bob to Alice) is used to send messages from Alice to Bob (Bob to Alice). A two-way channel can be used in both directions, from Alice to Bob, or from Bob to Alice.
is an adversarial channel that it is (partially) controlled by an adversary Eve, with two capabilities: Reading and Writing. For a codeword of length N , Eve selects a subset S r ⊆ [N ] of size |S r | = ρ r N to read (eavesdrop), and selects a subset S w ⊆ [N ] of size |S w | = ρ w N to write to (corrupt). The writing is by adding to c an error vector e with SUPP(e) = S w , resulting in c + e to be received. The adversary is adaptive and to select a component for reading and/or writing, it uses its knowledge of the codeword at the time. The subset S = S r ∪ S w of size |S| = ρN , is the set of components of the codeword that the adversary reads or writes to. The AWTP channel is called a restricted-AWTP channel if S r = S w = S.
We assume the adversarial wiretap channel is one-way and can only be used by Alice.
Definition 3: (Public Discussion Channel (PD Channel)) is an authenticated channel between Alice and Bob, that can be read by everyone including Eve.
We assume the PD channel is two-way can be used by Alice and Bob, both.
Hence in our AWTP PD setting Alice and Bob have access to a one-way AWTP channel and a two-way PD channel. We consider protocols with multiple message rounds and assume in each message-round a message is sent on one of the channels available to the communicants. In particular, in each message-round Alice can use either the AWTP or the PD channel.
Definition 4: The message-round complexity RC m of a protocol is the total number invocations of channels (AWTP and PD ) by the two the communicants.
III. AWTP PD PROTOCOL Alice (sender) wants to send a message (information) m ∈ M, securely and reliably to Bob (receiver), using a multi-round protocol over a AWTP PD channel, called an AWTP PD protocol.
The protocol consists of a sequence of message-rounds. Each message-round is in one of the following form: (i) Alice sends a message to Bob over AWTP channel, (ii) Alice sends a message to Bob over PD channel, and (iii) Bob sends a message to Alice over the PD channel.
Let c and d denote the total number of invocations of the AWTP channel, and the PD channel, respectively, and assume = c + d . Let r A and r B denote the randomness used by Alice and Bob.
The protocol messages (also called codewords) sent over the AWTP channel and the PD channel are denoted by c i and d i , respectively.
We use c i = {c 1 · · · c i } to denote the concatenation of protocol messages, transmitted over the AWTP channel after the i th invocation of the AWTP channel. Similarly d i = {d 1 · · · d i } is the concatenation of protocol messages sent over the PD , after the i th invocation of this channel.
Let the protocol message alphabets of the AWTP and PD channels be Σ and F 2 , respectively. In the i th invocation of the AWTP channel, Alice sends a codeword of length N i . In the i th invocation of the PD channel, Alice or Bob, sends a binary message of length n i . The number of symbols sent over the AWTP channel is N = c i=1 N i , and the number of bits transmitted over the PD , is n = d i=1 n i . Let the view of Alice and Bob when sending the i th codeword be, v i A and v i B , respectively. The view of a participant consists of all the protocol messages that are received before sending the i th codeword. When sending a message m, in the i th invocation of the AWTP channel, Alice constructs a codeword c i using her view, local randomness, and m,
. In each invocation of the PD channel, Alice (or Bob) generates the codeword d i using their view, local randomness and m,
Definition 5 (( , δ)-AWTP PD protocol): A secure ( , δ)-AWTP PD protocol satisfies the following two properties:
-Secrecy: For any two messages m 1 , m 2 ∈ M, the statistical distance between Eve's views of the protocol, when the same random coins r E are used by Eve, is bounded by .
-Reliability: For any message M S chosen by Alice, the probability that Bob outputs the message sent by Alice, is at least 1 − δ. That is,
Here probability is over the randomness of Alice and Bob and the adversary. The AWTP PD protocol provides perfect secrecy if = 0. If the adversary is passive, then Bob can always output the correct message m S and Pr(
The efficiency measures of an ( , δ)-AWTP PD protocol Π are, (i) the information rate R(Π) = log |M| N log |Σ| and, (ii) the message-round complexity RC(Π) = (r awtp , r pd ) denoting the number of invocations of the AWTP and the PD channels, respectively .
Definition 6: An ( , δ)-AWTP PD protocol family for a (ρ r , ρ w )-AWTP channel, is a family of protocols Π = {Π N } N ∈N , where Π N = ( , δ)-AWTP PD is an AWTP PD protocol for the (ρ r , ρ w )-AWTP channel. A protocol family Π achieves information rate R, if for any ξ > 0 there exist N 0 such that for any N ≥ N 0 , there is δ < ξ and,
The -secrecy (perfect secrecy) capacity C (C 0 ) of a (ρ r , ρ w )-AWTP PD channel is the largest achievable rate of all ( , δ)-AWTP PD ((0, δ)-AWTP PD ) protocol families for the channel.
Note that we effectively assume communication over the PD is free and consider communication cost of the AWTP only.
IV. BOUNDS ON ( , δ)-AWTP PD PROTOCOLS
We derive two efficiency bounds for ( , δ)-AWTP PD protocols: an upper bound on the rate, and a lower bound on the minimum number of message-rounds for such protocols.
A. Upper Bound on the Rate Theorem 1: The rate of an ( , δ)-AWTP PD protocol is bounded by,
In the following proof we assume ρ r + ρ w = 1, and |S r i ∪ S w i | = ρN < N for i = 1, · · · , c . The proof can also be extended to ρ r + ρ w > 1 and |S r i ∪ S w i | = ρN < N . The proof outline is as follows. We define a special adversary Adv 1 and prove an upper bound on the rate of any protocol over the AWTP PD channel assuming this adversary. The upper bound follows since any AWTP PD protocol must be secure against this adversary.
The proof has three steps. First (Step1), we define a (weak) adversary that before the start of the protocol, chooses, (i) the reading and the writing sets of all the invocations of the AWTP channel, and (ii) random errors of appropriate weight that will be added to the codewords in each AWTP channel invocation. For this adversary, we prove two lemmas (Lemmas 1 and 2) on the information leakage, given the adversary's views of the AWTP channel and the whole protocol, respectively. Second (Step 2), we use these lemmas to derive a bound on log |M| N log |Σ| . Finally 
Let c i and d i be the codewords transmitted over the AWTP channel and PD channel in the i th invocations of the two channels, respectively; c i,j and d i,j denote the j th components of codeword c i and d i , respectively; c i and d i denote concatenations of all codewords sent in all invocations up to, and including, the i th invocations of the AWTP and the PD channels, respectively. We use capital letters to refer to the random variables associated with, c i , d i , c i,j , d i,j , c i and d i , as C i , D i , C i,j , D i,j , C i and D i , respectively. Let C c ,r and C c ,w be the random variables of the protocol messages on the sets S c ,r and S c ,w , and C c ,a , C c ,b , C c ,c , C c ,d be the random variables corresponding to the sets, S c ,a , S c ,b , S c ,c , S c ,d , respectively.
Proof: The proof has three steps:
Step 1.
We define an adversary Adv 1 that works as follows: 1) Selects the reading and writing sets S c ,r and S c ,w , of all AWTP channel invocations, before the start of the protocol. 2) For each invocation, chooses a random error vector e i of appropriate weight; that is, chooses e w i , with uniform distribution from Σ |S w i | ; we have Pr(e w i ) = 1 |Σ| ρw N i . 3) During the protocol execution, uses the error vectors to corrupt the AWTP messages, reads the transmission on S c ,r and over PD channel. We give two lemmas that follow from -secrecy and δreliability of the ( , δ)-AWTP PD protocol against Adv 1 . Let V E denote the random variable of the adversary view at the end of the protocol.
Lemma 1: For an ( , δ)-AWTP PD protocol, the following holds:
Proof is in the full version of the paper.
Since Adv 1 selects the reading sets S c ,r before the start of the protocol, we have, V E = {C c ,r , D d }, and so, we have:
Lemma 2: For an ( , δ)-AWTP PD protocol, the following holds assuming the Adv 1 adversary:
Proof is in the full version of the paper. Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 are used to prove an upper bound on the rate of an ( , δ)-AWTP PD protocol, assuming adversary Adv 1 .
Step 2. We prove the upper bound:
Here, N is the total number of symbols sent over the AWTP channel, and n is the number of bits sent over the PD channel. Let C c and D d denote the set of possible protocol messages over the AWTP channel and the PD channel, respectively. We have:
From Lemma 1, the first term can be upper bound by:
The upper bound on the second item H(M |C c ,r D d ) is as follows:
Inequality (1) is from,
Using Lemma 2, we have,
From (4), (5), (6), we have,
We also have, log |M| (1) ≤ log |C c D d | (2) ≤ N log |Σ| + n,
where C c D d are possible (error free) transcripts of the protocol generated by the protocol encoders (at Alice and Bob). Here, (1) is because decoding without adversarial error recovers the message and so the number of possible encoding transcripts is ≥ |M|, and (2) is because of the set of corrupted transcripts is larger than the uncorrupted ones. Using (7) and (8), we have,
Using (2), (3), and (9), gives the upper bound on H(M ),
The above inequality must hold for any distribution on M, and in particular for a uniform distribution with H(M ) = log |M|.
Using δ ≤ H(δ) for 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1/2, we have, log |M| N log |Σ| ≤ 1 − ρ + 2 · (1 + log |Σ| 1 ) + 2 n + 2H(δ) + δn.
Step 3. We show that -secrecy capacity of a (ρ r , ρ w )-AWTP PD is bounded by:
Proof is by contradiction. Let C = 1 − ρ + 2 · (1 + log |Σ| 1 ) + 2 n +ξ, for some small constantξ > 0. From Definition 6, for any 0 <ξ ≤ min(ξ 5n , H −1 (ξ 5 )), there exits N 0 such that for any N > N 0 , we have δ <ξ and,
This contradicts the bound on log |M| N log |Σ| , and so,
Corollary 1: The perfect secrecy capacity of a (ρ r , ρ w )-AWTP PD channel is bounded by, C 0 ≤ 1 − ρ.
B. Lower Bound on the Message-Round Complexity
An efficient construction of a (0, δ)-AWTP code (one message-round) with rate R = 1 − ρ r − ρ w is given in [19] , implying that secure transmission over AWTP channels with one message-round protocols is possible if, ρ r + ρ w < 1.
In Section IV-A, we proved that for AWTP PD channels, C 0 ≤ 1 − ρ and so secure communication with ρ r + ρ w > 1 may be possible, as long as ρ < 1.
Theorem 2:
Perfectly secure protocols for AWTP PD channels require, (i) one message-round if ρ r + ρ w < 1.
(ii) at least three message-rounds, if ρ r + ρ w ≥ 1.
That is,
We use the same notations as in Section IV-A. Proof: We only need to prove (ii). The protocol must have at least two message-rounds and so can have one of the following forms. Note that to achieve privacy, at least one message-round of AWTP channel is needed. The third, fourth and fifth forms are not possible: in all these cases Bob's decoder will have the vector received through one round invocation of the AWTP channel, and so the protocol cannot have rate higher than 1−ρ r −ρ w . Bellow, we will show that the decoding error for Bob in the first and the second type protocols is not close to zero and so these two cases do not present valid alternatives.
Lemma 3: In an (0, δ)-AWTP PD protocol of the forms (1) or (2) above, if ρ r + ρ w ≥ 1, then,
V. AN OPTIMAL CONSTRUCTION
We first introduce the building blocks of the AWTP PD protocol, and then describe the construction. The rate of the protocol meets the upper bound. The protocol has three message-rounds and so meets the message-round complexity bound. The construction is inspired by Shi et al. [16] , but we need to consider the protocol over the AWTP PD channel where the adversary may read and write on different components of the codeword. We also need to choose the parameters of the protocol to achieve secrecy capacity.
A. Universal Hash Family
An (N, n, m)-hash family is a set F of N functions, f : X → T , f ∈ F, where |X | = n and |T | = m. Without loss of generality, we assume n ≥ m.
Definition 7: [17] Suppose the range T of an (N, n, m)hash family F is an additive Abelian group. F is called -∆ universal, if for any two elements x 1 , x 2 ∈ X , x 1 = x 2 ,, and for any element t ∈ T , there are at most N functions f ∈ F such that f (x 1 ) − f (x 2 ) = t, were the operation is from the group.
Let q be a prime and u ≤ q − 1. Let the message be x = {x 1 , · · · , x u }. For α ∈ F q , define the universal hash function hash α by the rule, t = hash α (x) = x 1 α + x 2 α 2 + · · · + x u α u mod q (10)
Then {hash α (·) : α ∈ F q } is a u q -∆ universal (q, q u , q)hash family. This is a known construction of u q -universal hash family [17] .
B. Randomness Extractor
A randomness extractor is a function, which is applied to a weakly random entropy source (i.e., a non-uniform random variable), to obtain a uniformly distributed source.
Definition 8: [6] A (seeded) (n, m, r, δ)-strong extractor is a function Ext : q n × q d → q m such that for any source X with H ∞ (X) ≥ r, we have SD((Ext(X, Seed), Seed), (U, Seed)) ≤ δ with the Seed uniformly distributed over F d q . A function Ext : q n → q m is a (seedless) (n, m, r, δ)extractor if for any source X with H ∞ (X) ≥ r, the distribution Ext(X) satisfies SD(Ext(X), U ) ≤ δ.
A seedless extractor can be constructed from Reed-Solomon (RS) codes [4] . The construction works only for a restricted class of sources, known as symbol-fixing sources.
Definition 9: An (n, m) symbol-fixing source is a tuple of independent random variables X = (X 1 , · · · , X n ), defined over a set Ω, such that m of the variables take values uniformly and independently from Ω, and the remaining variables have fixed values.
We show a construction of a seedless (n, m, m log q, 0)extractor from RS-codes. Let q ≥ n + m. Consider an (n, m) symbol-fixing source X = (X 1 , · · · , X n ) ∈ F n q with H ∞ (X) ≥ m log q. The extraction has two steps: 1) Construct a polynomial f (x) ∈ F q [X] of degree ≤ n−1, such that f (i) = x i for i = 0, · · · , n − 1. 2) Evaluate the polynomial at i = {n, · · · , n+m−1}. That is,
Let the AWTP channel have alphabet Σ = F u q and the message be m = {m 1 , · · · , m } ∈ M, where m i ∈ F q . Choose N such that q > 2uN 2 . We will use a u q -∆ universal (q, q u−1 , q)hash family and the above seedless (uN, , log q, 0)-extractor. The protocol has three message-rounds. In the first messageround Alice sends N randomly chosen elements to Bob over the AWTP channel. The next two transmissions are over the PD channel and are from Bob to Alice, and vice versa. Bob generates random keys, (α 1 , · · · , α N ), α i ∈ F q , for the hash family, and generates t = (t 1 , · · · , t N ) where, t i = hash αi (r i )+β i mod q. Bob maps d 1 = {α 1 , · · · , α N , t 1 , · · · , t N } to a binary vector over F 2 , and sends d 1 to Alice, over the PD channel. Alice receives d 1 .
and constructs a binary vector
Alice does the following.
-concatenates all r ij for which v ij = 1, and obtains (r i1 || · · · ||r is ) over F q .
-uses k = Ext(r i1 || · · · ||r is ) to obtain a uniformly random string.
-Alice encrypts m as c i = k i + m i mod q for i = 1, · · · , . Alice maps d 2 = {c, v} (over F q ) into a binary vector and sends it to Bob over the PD channel. Bob receives d 2 .
• Bob decodes Dec(y 1 , d 1 , d 2 ) as follows.
-Constructs the vector (r i1 || · · · ||r is ) with r ij ∈ F q , for all v ij = 1 in v. He uses the extractor to obtain, k = Ext(r i1 || · · · ||r is ).
Lemma 4: The AWTP PD protocol above, provides perfect secrecy if ≤ (u − 1)(1 − ρ)N .
Lemma 5: The probability of decoding error in the AWTP PD protocol is δ ≤ uN q . Lemma 6: The rate of the AWTP PD protocol family is R = 1 − ρ.
Proof: For a small ξ > 0, let the parameters of AWTP PD protocol be chosen as u = 1 ξ , q > 2uN 2 ,
For uniform message distribution, we have log |M| = log q, and so for any N > N 0 , the rate of AWTP PD protocol family is given by,
The probability of decoding error is bounded by,
Theorem 3: For any small ξ > 0, the protocol above is a (0, δ)-AWTP PD protocol with rate R(Π N ) = 1 − ρ − ξ. The transmission alphabet for the AWTP channel is of size |Σ| = q 1 ξ , and the decoding error is δ < ξ. The rate of the protocol approaches R = 1 − ρ as, N → ∞. The protocol has RC m =3 and the decoder computation is O((N log q) 2 ).
VI. AWTP PD PROTOCOL AND SMT-PD
In SMT-PD a sender S (Alice) and a receiver R (Bob) interact over N node disjoint paths (wires) in a synchronous network and a public discussion channel. Wires and the PD both are used for two-way communication. An SMT-PD protocol proceeds in rounds. In each round, Alice (Bob) sends protocol messages over wires and/or the PD channel, which will be received by Bob (Alice) before the end of the round. (Note that a round in SMT-PD may consist of one or two message-rounds.) A computationally unbounded adversary (Eve) can corrupt up to t wires. Eve can eavesdrop, modify or block messages sent over a corrupted wire. Adversary is adaptive and can corrupt wires any time during the protocol execution and after observing communications over the wires that she has corrupted so far. We consider protocol families Π = {Π N : N ∈ N} defined for t = ρN where 0 < ρ < 1 is a constant.
Definition 10: A protocol between S and R is an ( , δ)secure message transmission with public discussion (( , δ)-SMT-PD) protocol if the following two conditions are satisfied.
• Privacy: For every two messages m 1 , m 2 ∈ M and the randomness r E used by Eve, max m1,m2
where the probability is over the randomness of S, R. • Reliability: For any message M S chosen by Alice, Bob recovers the message with probability larger than 1 − δ; that is,
where the probability is over the randomness of the players S, R and Eve. Remark 1: In the above definition of SMT-PD, (i) S r = S w , and for |S r | = |S w | = ρN , (ii) wires are used for twoway communication, and (iii) in each message-round of the protocol, Alice (Bob) can invoke both types of channels simultaneously (wires and the PD) and so send two protocol message. In our model in Section III however, (i) S r and S w can be chosen arbitrarily, (ii) AWTP is from Alice to Bob only, and (iii) in each message-round one message over one channel (AWTP , or PD) can be sent.
Efficiency parameters of an SMT-PD protocol are, Round Complexity RC, Transmission Rate TR, and computational complexity.
• RC is the number of rounds of a protocol. We also use RC m to denote message-round complexity of these protocols. • TR is the number of communicated bits for transmitting a single message bit. Let W i denote the set of possible transmissions on wire i. The transmission rate of an SMT-PD protocol is given by,
An SMT-PD protocol is optimal if the transmission rate is of the order (Big O notation) of the lower bound. • An SMT-PD protocol is computationally efficient if the computational complexity of the sender and the receiver algorithms, is polynomial in N .
A. AWTP PD and One-way SMT-PD AWTP codes are defined over an alphabet Σ and all components of a codeword are elements of Σ. In SMT protocols however, the set of transmissions over different wires may be different.
Definition 11 (Symmetric SMT): An SMT protocol is called a symmetric if the protocol remains invariant under any permutation of the wires.
Let W i j , j = 1 · · · N, i = 1 · · · r, denote the set of possible transmissions on wire j in an r-round SMT protocol. For a symmetric protocol, W i j = W i is independent of j. All known constructions of threshold SMT protocols are symmetric.
Definition 12: A one-way symmetric secure message transmission with public discussion (( , δ)-SMT [ow−s] -PD ) protocol is an SMT-PD protocol in which transmission over wires is in one direction (from Alice to Bob, or Bob to Alice). The protocol has the same alphabet set for all wires. The N wires and the PD channel, can be invoked simultaneously.
We consider protocols where Alice wants to send a message to Bob and so AWTP channel is used by Alice.
Theorem 4: There is a one-to-one correspondence between restricted ( , δ)-AWTP PD protocols and ( , δ)-SMT [ow−s] -PD protocols. The following results on the latter protocols, follow from the results on the former, given in Section IV.
1) The lower bound on the transmission rate of a ( , δ)-
where = 2N (1 + log |W| 1 ) + 2 nN . For protocols with perfect secrecy ( = 0) we have,
2) The lower bound on the message-round complexity of a ( , δ)-SMT [ow] -PD protocol is three. Proof is omitted because of space. 1) Construction: A ( , δ)-AWTP PD protocol gives a restricted-( , δ)-AWTP PD protocol with ρ = ρ r = ρ w , and using the protocol conversion in Theorem 4, we obtain an ( , δ)-SMT [ow−s] -PD protocol. In Section V-C we gave the construction of a (0, δ)-AWTP PD protocol with minimum number of message rounds and rate approaching the capacity of the (ρ r , ρ w )-AWTP channel. Hence we have the following.
Lemma 7: There is a three message-round ( , δ)-SMT [ow−s] -PD protocol, with transmission rate, O( N N −t ), with computational complexity of decoding given by, O((N log q) 2 ).
2) Comparison with the known results: In [8] it was shown that secure SMT-PD protocols exist for N ≥ t + 1, and the following lower bound on the transmission rate was derived,
Here, m = log |M|. This gives a lower bound on transmission rate of ( , δ)-SMT [ow−s] -PD protocols because ( , δ)-SMT [ow−s] -PD protocols are a subset of SMT-PD protocols. It can be shown that for = 0 and δ > 0, (13) will be a tighter bound. For δ ≈ 0 and = a |M| however, (11) could give a higher value. This means that none of the two bounds (11) and (13) , will completely dominate the other. Details are omitted because of space.
In [16] , it was shown that the minimum round complexity of an SMT-PD protocol is three, and PD must be invoked in 
at least two rounds. Since an ( , δ)-SMT [ow−s] -PD is an SMT-PD with extra restrictions, the same bounds also hold for them. The rate-optimal ( , δ)-SMT [ow−s] -PD protocol in Section V-C has three message rounds, two of which use PD , and so the protocol achieves the lower bound on the number of rounds of ( , δ)-SMT [ow−s] -PD protocols.
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We motivated and introduced AWTP PD where Alice and Bob in addition to the AWTP channel, have access to a public discussion channel. We showed that with this new resource, secure communication is possible even when ρ r + ρ w ≥ 1 as long as ρ < 1. We derived an upper bound on the information rate, and a lower bound on the number of message rounds of protocols that provide -secrecy and δ-reliability, and constructed an optimal protocol family that achieve both these bounds. We showed the relationship between AWTP PD and ( , δ)-SMT [ow−s] -PD protocols in which wires are used by Alice only, and gave the construction of an optimal ( , δ)-SMT [ow−s] -PD protocol with minimum number of message rounds. A three-round protocol SMT-PD (two-way wires) with the same rate had been constructed in [16] . Our construction shows that the same rate and number of rounds can be obtained even if one assumes one-way communication over wires.
( , δ)-SMT [ow−s] -PD protocols allow secure communication when ρ r + ρ w ≥ 1 as long as |S r ∪ S w | < N . In our model the AWTP channel is one-way. An interesting open question is to obtain rate and RC m lower bounds for the case that interaction over the AWTP channel is possible.
